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Abstract
The opportunity to profit from dishonesty evokes a motivational conflict between the temptation to cheat for
selfish gain and the desire to act in a socially appropriate manner. Honesty may depend on self-control given
that self-control is the capacity that enables people to override antisocial selfish responses in favor of socially
desirable responses. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that dishonesty would increase when people's
self-control resources were depleted by an initial act of self-control. Depleted participants misrepresented
their performance for monetary gain to a greater extent than did non-depleted participants (Experiment 1).
Perhaps more troubling, depleted participants were more likely than non-depleted participants to expose
themselves to the temptation to cheat, thereby aggravating the effects of depletion on cheating (Experiment
2). Results indicate that dishonesty increases when people's capacity to exert self-control is impaired, and that
people may be particularly vulnerable to this effect because they do not predict it.
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Abstract
The opportunity to profit from dishonesty evokes a motivational conflict between the temptation to
cheat for selfish gain and the desire to act in a socially appropriate manner. Honesty may depend on
self-control given that self-control is the capacity that enables people to override antisocial selfish
responses in favor of socially desirable responses. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that
dishonesty would increase when people’s self-control resources were depleted by an initial act of
self-control. Depleted participants misrepresented their performance for monetary gain to a greater
extent than did non-depleted participants (Experiment 1). Perhaps more troubling, depleted
participants were more likely than non-depleted participants to expose themselves to the temptation
to cheat, thereby aggravating the effects of depletion on cheating (Experiment 2). Results indicate
that dishonesty increases when people’s capacity to exert self-control is impaired, and that people
may be particularly vulnerable to this effect because they do not predict it.
When given the opportunity to profit from a dishonest act, what determines whether people
cheat or remain honest? Such opportunities present a motivational conflict between taking
short-term, selfish gain and acting in virtuous ways that presumably bring long-term rewards
that include social acceptance. Resolving such dilemmas may be one of the core functions of
self-control.
Self-control is defined as the capacity to alter one’s responses, such as by overriding some
impulses in order to bring behavior in line with goals and standards (Baumeister, Heatherton,
& Tice, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1981). Brains evolved to serve the organisms that house them,
and so amoral selfishness is normal and natural in the animal kingdom. Social life, however,
requires some curtailing of selfishness for the sake of harmony and effective group functioning.
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Human social life (culture) features a great many rules and standards, including moral rules to
which individuals must conform if they are to maintain membership in the group and the group
is to function. Self-control, as the capacity to overcome selfish impulses so as to act in socially
desirable ways, has therefore been called the “moral muscle” (Baumeister & Exline, 1999).
Dramatic support for the importance of self-control for moral, prosocial behavior comes from
evidence that low self-control may be the single most important factor in producing criminal,
antisocial behavior (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).
If honesty depends on self-control, then the situational state of one’s capacity for self-control
should determine how people respond to opportunities for cheating. Research suggests that all
acts of self-control draw on a common resource that becomes depleted with use (e.g., Muraven,
Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). Thus, following one act of self-control,
people tend to perform relatively poorly on a subsequent, ostensibly unrelated self-control task
(see Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). In effect, the moral muscle loses some of its strength
after exertion.
The hypothesis for the present work was that dishonest behavior should increase when
resources for self-control have been depleted by prior exertion. In the present studies, self-
control resources were manipulated by having some participants engage in a first task that
required overriding of responses. Then they were given a second unrelated test with a monetary
incentive and an opportunity to increase their pay by claiming more correct answers than they
actually had. The prediction was that participants who had exerted self-control to override
responses on the first task would (falsely) claim more correct answers than other participants
on the second test.
Experiment 1
Method
Eighty-four (40 female) undergraduates were randomly assigned among four conditions. Self-
control resource depletion was manipulated using Schmeichel’s (2007) procedure: All
participants were asked to write a short essay without using words that contained either the
letters A and N (depletion condition) or the letters X and Z (no-depletion condition). Following
this task, participants self-reported their mood on the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988).
Ostensibly as a separate experiment, participants were then given a sheet with 20 number
matrices, each containing 12 3-digit numbers (e.g., 4.69; see Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008).
We instructed participants to find the two numbers in each matrix that summed to 10.00.
Instructions and an example were printed at the top of the page. Participants were told they
would earn $.25 for each correct solution.
After 5 minutes, participants in the experimenter-scored conditions gave their worksheets to
the experimenter, who scored their task and paid them accordingly. Performance in this
condition provided a baseline assessment of how many matrices participants could complete
in 5 minutes when they did not have the opportunity to cheat.
Participants in the self-scored conditions (cheating-possible) simply checked a box below the
matrix when they identified two numbers in the matrix that summed to 10. After 5 minutes,
participants counted how many matrices they had checked, recycled (destroyed) their
worksheets, and paid themselves for their performance. We orchestrated an opportunity for
them to misrepresent their performance by placing two envelopes on the desk prior to their
arrival: one envelope contained 20 quarters and the other was empty. Participants were
instructed to keep one quarter for every matrix they solved correctly, and to transfer the
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remaining quarters to the empty envelope and leave it on the desk. The dependent measure was
the number of quarters taken.
Results and Discussion
In two conditions, participants paid themselves for their performance, whereas in two
additional conditions, the experimenter paid participants according to their actual performance.
To assess dishonesty, we compared the number of quarters taken by participants in the self-
scored condition to the number of quarters earned by participants in the experimenter-scored
condition.
A 2 (depletion vs. no-depletion) × 2 (self-scored vs. experimenter-scored) ANOVA yielded
the predicted results. First, participants in the self-scored conditions took more quarters than
what participants in the experimenter-scored conditions were able to earn in the same amount
of time, F(1, 80) = 11.52, p = .001, hp2 = 0.13. This main effect was qualified by the predicted
depletion condition X scoring condition interaction, F(1, 80) = 5.40, p = .023, hp2 = 0.06 (see
Figure 1).
Non-depleted participants claimed 25% more correct answers in the self-scored than in the
experimenter-scored condition, which is implausible and suggests some dishonesty. Among
depleted participants, the discrepancy (and by implication the dishonesty) was considerably
greater, at 104%. A planned contrast confirmed that depleted participants in the self-scored
condition took more quarters than their non-depleted counterparts, F(1, 80) = 7.09, p = .009,
hp2 = 0.08.
Depletion (prior self-control) did not alter actual performance, as shown in the experimenter-
scored condition (t<1). Nor did it affect positive or negative mood (ts<1). In sum, results
indicated that self-control resource depletion led to dishonest behavior.
Experiment 2
Outside the laboratory, people can sometimes choose whether to enter, leave, or avoid
situations that contain the temptation to indulge inappropriate or antisocial impulses. Knowing
that depleted resources could weaken one’s resistance to temptation, people may avoid
opportunities to cheat. On the other hand, diminished resources might make people less
effective at such proactive self-regulation as avoiding temptation. Experiment 2 tested the
effects of depletion on both whether people exposed themselves to temptation and how they
responded if they were tempted to cheat.
Method
Seventy-eight undergraduates (50 female) participated. Participants in the depletion condition
completed 20 incongruent trials of the Stroop task (e.g., Gailliot et al., 2006). On each trial,
participants had to name the color of the ink, which demands self-control to suppress the
meaning of the word (e.g., blue printed in red). In the no-depletion condition, the words
matched the ink colors, so self-control was not needed. A bogus debriefing supposedly ended
the study.
Shortly thereafter, participants were approached by another experimenter with a 25-question
quiz about the university. All agreed to participate and were then offered $.10 per correct
answer. The experimenter told them to circle their answers on the question sheet, and that they
would later transfer their answers to a bubble sheet after finishing.
When participants finished the quiz, they were told that the experimenter had only 2 bubble
sheets left, one of which already had the correct answers lightly marked on it, but the participant
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could still mark his or her chosen answers. The experimenter said she hoped to run yet another
participant that day, but the participant could use either sheet. The experimenter then collected
the bubble sheet, tallied the number of correct answers, and paid the participant accordingly.
Results and Discussion
Our first dependent measure was the type of bubble sheet chosen. As predicted, depleted
participants (74%) were more likely than non-depleted participants (40%) to choose the pre-
marked bubble sheet, χ2 (1, N = 78) = 7.67, p = .006. Thus, depleted participants were more
likely than non-depleted participants to expose themselves to the temptation to cheat.
Our second dependent measure was the number of correct answers claimed. Every participant
answered all 25 questions. The unmarked (no-opportunity) test enabled accurate scoring of
performance, and thereby provided a baseline measure of performance. If participants with
pre-marked sheets claimed more correct than the baseline, the implication was that they
changed their answers to the pre-marked correct ones (i.e., cheating). Sure enough, participants
who chose the pre-marked sheets claimed more correct answers than those who chose the
unmarked sheets, F(1, 74) = 92.32, p < .0001, hp2 = .56. More important, the interaction
between self-selected bubble sheet and depletion condition was significant, F(1, 74) = 4.16,
p = .045, hp2 = .053 (see Figure 2a).
A planned contrast indicated that depleted participants who chose the pre-marked answer sheet
answered more questions correctly than their non-depleted counterparts, F(1, 74) = 15.76, p
< .0001, hp2 = .18 (see Figure 2a). Given that performance on the task did not differ between
depleted and non-depleted participants in the unmarked condition (F<1), it is likely that the
elevated performance by depleted participants in the pre-marked condition was the result of
cheating.
Not only were depleted participants more likely to put themselves in a situation that enabled
cheating, they also cheated to a greater extant than non-depleted participants once they were
in the situation that enabled cheating. We depict the aggregation of these two effects in Figure
2b. Using the weighted mean of participants with the unmarked sheets as the baseline, we found
that the total amount of over-claiming of correct answers (and money) was 197% higher in the
depleted than in the non-depleted condition. Thus, cheating levels were considerably amplified
by the combined effect of depletion increasing participants’ propensity of placing themselves
in a situation that enabled cheating, and then cheating to a greater degree than others once in
that situation.
Although depleted participants put themselves in a situation that facilitated cheating, it was
still not clear whether they were able to recognize the implications of depletion on dishonesty.
It might have been that participants were perfectly aware of the effects of depletion on cheating,
but that they did not care. To test intuitions about depletion and cheating, we asked forty
undergraduates (20 female) to complete the congruent (no-depletion) or incongruent version
(depletion) of the Stroop task (see Experiment 2). Next, participants were given a description
of Experiment 2, including the general knowledge quiz and the two types of bubble sheets.
They then indicated the likelihood that they would choose the pre-marked bubble sheet over
the blank bubble sheet (1 = not very likely; 7 = very likely). Subsequently, we asked participants
to imagine that they had been given the pre-marked bubble sheet and to estimate the likelihood
they would transfer their answers from the quiz sheet to the bubble sheet honestly (i.e., without
changing the answers; 7-point scale). Consistent with the idea that individuals have little
intuition about the role of depletion on their cheating behavior, the likelihood of choosing the
pre-marked bubble sheet (t<1) and completing the task honestly (t<1) did not differ as a function
of depletion condition. These results suggest that depleted participants did not recognize that
they would have a difficult time overcoming the temptation to cheat.
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General Discussion
The present findings link self-control to cheating. When people’s self-control resources have
been taxed by a prior act of self-control, cheating increases. In Experiment 1, depleted
participants claimed more answers (and hence took more money) than did non-depleted
participants. In Experiment 2, depleted participants were more likely than others to expose
themselves to the temptation to cheat – and they were also more likely to succumb to that
temptation, thus again claiming more correct answers and more money than they were entitled
to claim. In that study, the combined effect of exposing themselves more to temptation and
then also succumbing to the temptation to cheat at a higher rate entailed that depleted
participants cheated three times as much as non-depleted participants.
Although these results were consistent with our hypotheses, several alternative explanations
warrant mention. One might suggest that depleted participants took more money than non-
depleted participants in Experiment 1 because they felt that they deserved more money for
their heightened effort on the first task. Two pieces of evidence suggest that this is unlikely.
First, there were no differences in positive or negative affect as a function of the depletion
manipulation. Second, the depletion task and matrix task were presented as two separate
experiments that were in the same session merely out of convenience.
An alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 2 might hold that depleted participants
chose the pre-marked bubble sheet to help the experimenter. Again two facts speak against
this. First, helpfulness cannot account for the cheating itself. If participants were trying to be
helpful by choosing the pre-marked sheet, they should have been less likely to misrepresent
their work, rather than more likely to misrepresent their work. By misrepresenting their work,
they could hardly hope to help the experimenter, and indeed it would potentially invalidate
their responses. The helpfulness explanation thus lacks parsimony and consistency. Second,
previous work suggests that depletion reduces helpfulness rather than increasing it (DeWall,
Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008).
In the present studies, as in many social situations, honesty required individuals to sacrifice
selfish gain. Society benefits from such sacrifices, insofar as trust, fairness, and similar patterns
make cultural and economic relations possible. It is not surprising that human beings sometimes
are torn between taking what they can get away with and doing what is socially valued and
appropriate. The capacity for self-control may be a vital psychological organ for enabling
people to choose the latter course and thereby to make human culture possible. Selfish impulses
may however continue to lurk beneath the surface of civilized behavior, and when self-control
has been weakened by depletion of its resources, selfish and dishonest behavior may readily
ensue.
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Figure 1.
Number of quarters taken by participants for peformance on a matrix task as a function of
depletion condition and cheating condition (Experiment 1). Error bars represent standard
errors.
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Figure 2.
Figure 2a. Average number of “correct” answers on the general knowledge quiz as a function
of depletion condition and self-selected answer sheet (Experiment 2). Error bars represent
standard errors.
Figure 2b. Percentage of total monetary earnings as a function of depletion condition and self-
selected answer sheet (Experiment 2).
Mead et al. Page 9
J Exp Soc Psychol. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2010 January 1.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
